For years, Chinese officials have portrayed the rise of “lying flat” (tang ping), a term used by young people rejecting intense competition and unrealistic expectations of success, as a cultural problem, with some officials blaming “foreign forces” for encouraging pessimism among China’s youth.
But behind the debate lies a far more difficult reality: a generation facing slowing economic growth, fewer secure jobs and declining confidence that education and hard work will guarantee upward mobility.
China’s youth unemployment rate has climbed again, with official figures showing that unemployment among people aged 16 to 24 who are not in education reached 16.9% in March, a four-month high.
The challenge is expected to intensify as China prepares for another record wave of university graduates. The government forecasts that 12.7 million students will graduate this year, creating further pressure on an already struggling labour market.
For many young people, graduation is increasingly becoming a pathway into uncertainty rather than a gateway to opportunity.
A statistical overhaul that changed the picture, but not the problem
Youth unemployment has been a growing concern for Beijing for several years.
In mid-2023, official figures showed unemployment among 16- to 24-year-olds rising steadily, reaching a record 21.3% in June. Shortly afterwards, authorities suspended publication of youth unemployment data for six months, saying that statistical methods needed to be revised.
When the figures returned in December 2023, the reported unemployment rate had fallen sharply to 14.9%.
The change reflected a revised methodology that excluded young people currently in education from the calculation. It also raised questions among economists and observers over whether the new figures fully captured the scale of employment difficulties facing younger workers.
Under China’s revised definition, a person must have actively searched for work within the previous three months to be counted as unemployed. This has attracted scrutiny because many university graduates spend extended periods preparing for civil service examinations or other career qualifications rather than immediately entering the job market.
As a result, some young people experiencing prolonged difficulty finding work may not appear in official unemployment statistics.
The rise of insecure work behind China’s employment numbers
Another major shift in China’s labour market has been the rapid expansion of “flexible employment”, including gig work, freelance jobs and self-employment.
By 2024, around 240 million people were estimated to be engaged in some form of flexible employment, representing a significant share of China’s urban workforce.
For many, this means working as delivery riders, ride-hailing drivers, domestic workers or online content creators. While these jobs provide income opportunities, they often come with limited employment protections, unstable earnings and little long-term security.
China’s official employment statistics also count someone as employed if they work for as little as one hour per week.
Labour advocates argue that this definition risks obscuring the difference between having a job and having a secure livelihood.
In March, Chinese authorities issued guidance encouraging university graduates and young people to pursue self-employment and flexible work as part of efforts to support employment.
But critics warn that expanding insecure work cannot substitute for creating stable, well-paid jobs with meaningful protections.
Graduate numbers are rising as opportunities shrink
Even after the methodological changes, unemployment among young workers remains elevated.
Official data showed that youth unemployment reached 18.9% in August last year before easing after the peak summer graduation period. In February this year, authorities reported that the rate had fallen to 16.1%, describing it as an eight-month low.
However, the improvement proved temporary.
By March, youth unemployment had risen again to 16.9%, an increase of 0.8 percentage points from the previous month and 1.6 percentage points higher than two years earlier.
The situation among older young workers is also deteriorating. The unemployment rate for those aged 25 to 29, a group that includes many university graduates entering the workforce reached 7.7%, the highest level since the government began publishing data for this age group in late 2023.
The timing is significant. July and August traditionally bring the highest pressure on China’s youth labour market as millions of graduates enter the workforce.
This year’s graduate cohort is expected to reach 12.7 million, around 900,000 more than in 2024.
With fewer jobs available and economic confidence weakened, competition for employment is intensifying.
From “lying flat” to “rat people”: a generation losing faith in the future
The economic pressures facing young Chinese workers have produced new social expressions.
The phrase “lying flat” (tang ping) emerged as a rejection of relentless competition, long working hours and the belief that personal sacrifice would inevitably lead to success.
More recently, the term “rat people” (laoshuren) has appeared on Chinese social media, describing young people who withdraw from society, remain at home for extended periods and disengage from employment.
While often dismissed as individual choices or a lack of ambition, these trends reflect deeper concerns about social mobility and economic security.
For decades, China’s social contract has been built around the idea that education and hard work could deliver a better life. But as housing costs rise, competition intensifies and secure employment becomes harder to find, many young people are questioning whether that promise still holds.
As millions of graduates prepare to enter the workforce this summer, the pressure on China’s labour market is likely to intensify and the frustration among young workers may prove increasingly difficult to ignore.